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United States v. Hollinshead:
A New Leap in Extraterritorial Application
of Criminal Laws
By Wniui J. HuGES
Member of the Class of 1977.
0 N AUGUST 28,1972, a federal grand jury handed up an indictment
charging Clive Hollinshead, George Alamilla, and Johnnie Brown
Fell with conspiring to transport stolen goods in interstate and foreign
commerce, and causing the transportation of stolen property in inter-
state commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. The salient facts of
the case are these: Hollinshead, a dealer in pre-Columbian artifacts,
arranged with Alamilla to procure such artifacts in Central America,
and to finance Alamilla in doing so. The evidence centered primarily
on one artifact, a rare and valuable pre-Columbian stela, known as
Machaquila Stela 2. The stela, a large limestone slab, eighty-two inches
high and forty-nine inches wide, has the figure of a priest on its face,
and hieroglyphs on its face and side. It was found at a recently dis-
covered Mayan ruin in the jungle of Guatemala. The Machaquila Stela
2 was cut into pieces and brought to Fells fish packing plant i- Belize,
British Honduras. There the pieces were packed into boxes marked
"personal effects" and addressed to Hollinshead at Santa Fe Springs,
California. Hollinshead was present during this operation as were cer-
tain Guatemalan officers, who departed after receiving certain gratui-
ties. The stela was shipped to Miami, Florida, where Fell and another
conspirator picked it up. They attempted, without success, to sell it
to various collectors and museums in the United States, traveling with
it to Georgia, New York, Wisconsin, and North Carolina. Ultimately,
it arrived in Hollinshead's possession in California, where he offered the
stela for sale until it was seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
On March 14, 1973, Hollinshead and Fell were found guilty in a
Los Angeles Federal District Court on both counts.' The District Court
opinion was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeal for the
Ninth Circuit, and rehearing was subsequently denied.2
1. United States v. Hollinshead, No. 10970 DC (S.D.Cal., March 14, 1973).
2. United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
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Since Hollinshead's conviction, the case has been cited frequently
by noted publicists in the field of Art Law.8 Some have heralded
United States v. Hollinshead as the beginning of American responsi-
bility in dealing with the illicit traffic in plundered antiquities. A closer
look by a student of criminal jurisdiction suggests that United States
v. Hollinshead may not be the vehicle for that celebrated beginning.
Yet, the case does provide an excellent vehicle for a reexamination of
current extraterritorial application of penal laws by the United States.
Indeed, the implications of the Hollinshead holding demand a closer
look at the case. Clive Hollinshead and Johnnie Fell were subjected
to criminal penalties in the United States for the importation of Mayan
artifacts illegally exported from Guatemala.4 The acts which caused
the artifacts to be characterized as stolen occurred within the State of
Guatemala. The law which characterized the stela as "stolen" was
Guatemalan criminal law. It is not a crime under the laws of the United
States to remove artifacts from sites in the jungles of Guatemala, -Cam-
bodia, India or any other country. However, removal of those same
artifacts to the United States was determined to be a direct violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 under the Hollinshead holding.
The Hollinshead case raises the perplexing question how do articles
not characterized as stolen under the laws of the United States become
the basis for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314; interstate transportation
of stolen property. The District Court never arrived at this question.
The jury was instructed that three elements were required in order to
*establish the offense charged in Count II (18 U.S.C. § 2314). First,
the act of transporting or causing to be transported the Mayan artifact
known as Machaquila Stela 2 in interstate commerce; second, with the
knowledge that the artifacthad been stolen; and third, that the Mayan
artifact had a value of $5,000.00 or more.0
The Court was chiefly concerned with establishing the character
of the stela as "stolen." Where the artifact was stolen was immaterial
as long as it was "stolen" somewhere and the defendants so realized.
Expert testimony was received as to the law of Guatemala regarding
artifacts such as Machaquila Stela 2.0 Instructions were given as to the
3. Merryman, Protection of Artistic National Patrimony Against Pillaging and Thaft,
ARiT LAw: Domsvc AND INTERNATioNAL 245 (L. Duboff ed. 1975); F. FELDMsAN &
S. Ww., ArTwoRKs: LAW, PoLicY, PRACTICE 597 (1971); K. MEYEn, Tim PLUNDItIED
PAsT 32-33 (1973).
4. GUAT. CONST. art. 107, 109(g); GtTAT. CONGnEss DECIIEE No. 425 (as modified
by DEcmrEE No. 437).
5. United States v. Hollinshead, No. 10970 DC (S.D.Cal., March 14, 1973) at 110.
6. 495 F.2d at 1155.
definition of the word "stolen" as used in 18 U.S.C. § 2314,- and that
possession of property recently stolen is a circumstance from which it
may be inferred that the person in possession of .the property knew it
was stolen.8 Finally, the jury was instructed that there was a presump-
tion that every person knows what the law forbids.9 The jury found
that Hollinshead must have known, as an art dealer, that the stela was
stolen under the laws of Guatemala, and therefore found him guilty
of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2314.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court decision in a
three-page opinion. 10 The only claim raised by appellant that was
deemed meritorious was the error in instruction that every person
knows what the law forbids.'1 The Ninth Circuit held that such an
instruction, even if error, was not prejudicial. '2 The Court of Appeals
stated the trial judge gave the instruction because the law under which
the appellants were charged was the law of the United States, and
also because, while the government was required to prove that ap-
pellants knew that the stela was stolen, it was not required to prove
that appellants knew where it was stolen. 13 The opinion went on to
hold that appellants' knowledge of Guatemalan law is relevant only
to the extent that it bears upon the issue of their knowledge that the
stela was stolen.
Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals noted that
Hollinshead was being prosecuted in the United States for an accessory
crime the principle of which is not a crime under United States law.
The punishment of a person in California for the transportation of
goods, the theft of which is a crime only under the laws of Guatemala,
presented no paradox to either court. Yet clearly, these circumstances
raise a number of questions. As noted by one commentator:
The case is interesting from a variety of points of view, independ-
ently of the extent to which diplomatic representations by Guate-
mala were instrumental in bringing the United States to prosecute.
For example, there are some nice questions of private international
law: What of the rule that one state will not enforce the penal lavs
of another? Whose law should determine whether or not an object
is classified as stolen or not?14
7. Id. at 1156.
8. Id. at 1155, see DEvrrr & BrAcIxi . § 13.04.
9. Id. at 1154.
10. Id
11. Id. at 1155.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Merryman, supra, note 3.
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United States v. Hollinshead raises two reoccurring issues in the extra-
territorial application of United States penal laws: judicial jurisdiction
over the offense and criminal choice of law. The relevant facts of the
case actually place it in the unsettled area between these two impor-
tant issues. A look is required into the never-never land where inter-
national law, criminal law, and conflict of law converge.
Concededly, Hollinshead and Fell were indicted for their acts in
the United States; transportation of stolen artifacts in interstate com-
merce. However, the acts committed within the United States were
criminal only if the property transported was in 'fact "stolen." The
characterization of the property as "stolen" was accomplished through
introduction but paradoxically not application of Guatemalan criminal
law. Therefore if the criminal law of Guatemala was an improper choice
of law, one would arrive full circle again to the original issue of juris-
diction. In this unusual case the problems of judicial jurisdiction and
choice of law really then approach a single integrated issue. One must
begin, however, with a discussion of the component parts.
The first important component involves jurisdiction over the offense.
There is probably no better settled jurisdictional principle of inter-
national law than the territorial principle.", A basic tenet of this
principle is that the penal laws of one State will not be enforced in
another.16 As stated by the Permanent Court of ]nternational Justice
in the famous case of the S.S. Lotus (1927). 17
The first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon
a State is that - failing the existence of a permissive rule to the
contrary - it may not exercise its power in any form in the terri-
tory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial;
it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by
virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or
from a convention."8
The United States, Great Britain, France, and the majority of other
civilized nations all recognize that penal laws and their effect are
governed by the territorial principle. 9
The United States showed an early acceptance of this principle:
Supreme Court Justice John Marshall stated quite succinctly in The
15. 2 J. MooE, A DiGEsT OF INTERNATIoNAL LAw 236 (1906).
16. Id.
17. The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10.
18. Id. at 18-19.
19. See generally, L. OppxNHEIm, INTmNATioNAL LAw 298. (7th ed. Lauterpaclt,
1948); DEVAImS, INTRODUCTION A L'ETUDE Du Daorr INTENATIONAL 438-58 (1922).
Antelope (1825 ),20 "the courts of no country execute the penal laws of
another."-1 The Department of State announced in 1910 that, "inas-
much as under Anglo-Saxon legal theory, crime is territorial, not per-
sonal, and therefore the criminal jurisdiction of the United States does
not, as a general rule, extend to crimes committed outside its jurisdic-
tion, whether by American citizens or aliens."-- Again in 1913 the
Department of State declared that, as the territorial theory of crime
obtained in the United States, it would not be practicable "for this
Government to enter into a treaty arrangement with the Brazilian
Government providing for the prosecution of persons for committing
in Brazil the crimes of counterfeiting money, securities, etc."2 Re-
sponding to a request in 1926 from the Danish Minister at Washington
to undertake prosecution of a Chinese national who was alleged to
have killed an officer on a Danish vessel while on the high seas,
the Department of State decided that there appeared to be no law
giving American courts jurisdiction in such a case.2 4 Justice Holmes,
refusing to allow legislation to penalize American citizens for acts
committed in Costa Rica and Panama, stated:
It is obvious that, however stated, the plaintiff's case depends on
several rather startling propositions ... [In the] first place the acts
causing the damage were done so far as appears, outside the juris-
diction of the United States and within that of other states. It is
surprising to hear it argued that they were governed by the Act of
Congress.2 5
The territorial principle is a cornerstone of the concept of sover-
eignty of nations. It is well established that the criminal jurisdiction
of a nation is limited to its own dominions and to vessels under its flag
on the high seas, and that it cannot extend to acts committed within
the dominion of another without violating that State's sovereignty and
independence.2 6 In the words of Justice Story:
[Ilt is wholly incompatible with the equality and exclusiveness of
the sovereignty of all nations, that any one nation should be at
20. The Antelope, 24 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66.
21. Id. at 123.
22. 1 C. HYim, INTEniNATIoNAL LAw, CHIEFLY AS INTmunEEm AND APiLMD BY
HE UNrI STATEs 799 (2d ed. 1947).
23. Id. at 800.
24. Id.
25. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355 (1909). In ref-
erence to American Banana Co., the Court has observed "that was a civil case, but
as the statute is criminal as well as civil, it presents an analogy." (United States v.
Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
26. MooRE, .supra, note 15.
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liberty to regulate either persons or things not within its own terri-
tory. It would be equivalent to a declaration that the sovereignty
over a territory was never exclusive in any nation, but only con-
current with that of all nations; that each could legislate for all,
and none for itself; and that all might establish rules for which none
were bound to obey. The absurd results of such a state of things
need not be dwelt upon.2 7
The early opinions of American courts supported this concept in
many similar statements:
It may be assumed, as a general proposition, that the criminal laws
of a state do not bind, and cannot affect, those out of the territorial
reach of the state. Each state, in respect to each of the others, is
an independent sovereignty, possessing ample powers, and with the
exclusive right to determine within its own borders what shall be
tolerated and what prohibited; while each thus sovereign within
its own limits, it cannot impose its laws upon those outside the
limits of its sovereign power.28
The normal justification for the territorial limitation on penal laws
is simply that, as a matter of convenience, crimes should be dealt with
by the state whose social order is most closely affected. Generally, this
will be the state on whose territory the crimes are committed.20 In
Hollinshead, the crime, transportation of stolen property in interstate
commerce, was committed within the territory of the United States,
The commission of the crime in the United States, however, required
introduction of the criminal law of Guatemala, the State wherein the
principal crime, theft, was committed. Despite the accessory acts of
transportation in the United States, it would appear that it was the
social order of Guatemala that was most closely affected by the plunder
of the Machaquila Stela.
The United States no longer subscribes to the territorial principle
as an absolute limitation on the application of its penal laws. Federal
legislation has frequently been applied to cover activities by United
States nationals done primarily or entirely outside United States bor-
ders. Treasonable acts by American citizens are punishable wherever
committed.30 Making a false oath before a United States consular offi-
cer is a punishable offense, even when committed in another country."
27. J. STORY, COMENTARIES ON TM CONFLICr OF LAWS (8th ed. 1883) § 18.
28. Johns v. The State, 19 Ind. 421, 423-424 (1862).
29. See generally MOORE, supra, note 15.
30. Treason Act 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1948).
31. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961).
Distribution of heroin in Thailand by an American citizen was recently
held to be a crime under 21 U.S.C. § 174.32 Courts have upheld such
extraterritorial applications on a variety of theories; all stopping short
of the nationality principle, wherein jurisdiction is based on the na-
tionality or national character of the offender.33
The two most frequently employed theories to justify exercising
criminal jurisdiction over American citizens for their acts committed
abroad have been the protective principle and the styled "objective"
territorial principle. The distinction between these principles as applied
by American courts is sometimes one of semantics, rather than sub-
stance. The protective principle has been alternately defined in the
United States as a separate basis of jurisdiction and as an exception
to the territorial principle.3 4 A recent pronouncement by an American
court defined the protective principle as a jurisdiction embracing con-
duct abroad that threatens the nation's security as a state or the opera-
tion of its governmental functions, provided the proscribed conduct is
not an exercise of a liberty authorized by the law of the place or that
it is not recognized generally as criminal conduct.3 5 The protective
theory was recognized by the Permanent Court of International Justice
in the S.S. Lotus:3 6
It is certain that the Courts of many countries, even in countries
which have given their criminal legislation a strictly territorial
character, interpret criminal law in the sense that offenses the ttu-
thors of which at the moment of commission are in the territory of
another state, are nevertheless to be regarded as having committed
in the national territory, if one of the constituent eleroents of the
offense, and more specifically, its effects have taken place there.37
Under the protective theory of jurisdiction, a state has jurisdiction with
respect to any crime committed outside of its territory against the
territorial integrity or political independence of the state.38 It also
encompasses acts committed outside the territorial limits of a state
but intended to produce or producing effects within the state's bound-
32. United States v. DaniszewsKi, 380 F.Supp. 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
33. The notable exception is treason, held to be capable of commission only by a
United States citizen see Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
34. vsTrATs zNr (SEcoND) OF FonEcN REAONS LAW OF Tm Uzrrm STArEs
(1965) § 18 (comment) and § 33.
35. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.Id 8, 10 (2d Cir. 198).
36. The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.IJ., ser. A, No. 10.
37. Id. at 23.
38. United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F.Supp. 479 (S.D.Cal. 1960).
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aries.3 9 The Restatement Second of Foreign Relations Law includes
within the territorial principle those instances in which activity outside
the country "causes an effect within its territory."a° This enunciated
principle has been termed the objective territorial principle. American
courts, including the District Court in Hollinshead, have declared such
principle to be a basis of jurisdiction in the United States.I The ob-
jedtive territorial principle has been defined by the courts as a ju-
risdiction embracing acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended
to produce and producing detrimental effects within it.4 2 American
courts, as noted, have also defined the protective principle as a juris-
diction encompassing. acts committed outside the territorial limits of
a State, but intending to produce or producing effects within the State's
boundaries.48
It has been suggested by Professor George that the two principles,
the territorial and protective, be delineated by a distinction between
acts directly harmful and indirectly harmful.44 If the interest sought
to be protected can be impaired only by a physical act occurring with-
in the geographical limits of the State, the principle involved would be
the territorial principle. On the other hand, if the interest may also be
impaired by activity occurring elsewhere, punishment for extraterri-
torial acts would be based on the protective principle. 4" A distinction
based on direct harm as contrasted with indirect harm eliminates the
concept of the objective territorial principle and incorporates the ju-
risdiction it envisions entirely within the protective principle. The
standard proposed by Professor George obviously does not expand nor
contract criminal jurisdiction; it merely eliminates confusion regarding
jurisdictional labels.
The Draft Convention of Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime would
39. Id. See also The 1931 Resolutions of the Institut de Droit Internatlonale, art,
4: "Any State has the right to punish acts committed outside its territory, even by
aliens, when the acts constitute: (a) an attack against security (b) a falsification of
its money, its stamps, seal, or official marques." Art. 4 is printed in SORENs N, MANUAL
OF PuBLIC INTErtNATIONAL LAw 355 (1968).
40. REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1965) § 18.
41. Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 886 (5th Cir. 1907); United States v.
Daniszewski, 380 F.Supp. 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
42. Strassheim v. Dailey, 221 U.S. 280 (1911); United States v. Fernandez, 490
F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1974). Justice Holmes, in the Strassheim. case, did not label the
jurisdiction base the objective territorial principle; the label was attached by subsequent
cases in citing Strassheim.
43. United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F.Supp. 479 (S.D.Cal. 1960).
44. George, Extraterritorial Application of Penal Laws, 64 MIcE. L. REv. 009, 018
(1966).
45. Id. at 618-619.
eliminate such confusion over the labels, protective principle and ob-
jective territorial principle, by attaching legal consequences to conduct
outside a nation's territory which affects a "gov.ernmental interest.""n
The governmental interest basis proposed is quite similar to that ad-
vanced by Professor Currie in the area of civil conflict of laws. The
protective principle and objective territorial principle would be merged
into one jurisdictional theory. Clearly, however, the State through its
legislation protects a multitude of interests, including those of the
person, of property, of reputation and of the government itself.47
The governmental interest standard from the standpoint of criminal
law could be uncomfortably vague. Unlike many foreign penal codes
which specifically designate crimes enforceable extraterritorially,4 and
deemed by the State to effectuate a definite governmental interest,
there are no guidelines for judicial application of this standard in the
United States. Unfettered judicial discretion as to what constitutes a
governmental interest, and therefore a crime, raises serious questions.
For example, how is the United States national to know he is adversely
affecting a valid governmental interest by his or her conduct abroad?
Certainly an after-the-fact determination by an American court upon
his or her return to the United States is not satisfactory. In the absence
of specific legislative pronouncements as to what the United States
claims to be its legislatively-protected interests, the governmental in-
terest standard or principle as a criminal law doctrine is an open invita-
tion to judicial abuse. The applicability of United States penal laws to
extraterritorial acts by nationals should not be reached because of con-
scious or unconscious ideas of social expediency, rather than because
of any compelling logic.
Under contemporary ideas of international law, it is accepted that
a state may exercise jurisdiction over its nationals, with respect to
their conduct whether within or outside its territory.40 Some national
criminal codes in fact commence the section on the scope of their ap-
plication by sweeping statements. For instance, the Indian Penal Code
applies to any citizen of India regardless of where the offense is com-
mitted.5° Most foreign penal codes embracing the nationality principle
of jurisdiction state explicitly when citizens may be punished for acts
46. Harvard Research In International Law, arts. 3, 7, 8; 29 A.N.J.TNfs.L. Supp. 439-
440 (1935).
47. See Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HAnv. L. REv. 1 (1943).
48. Infra, note 53.
49. Harvard Research In International Law, supra, note 46, at 433-445; 2 O'Co-
NELL, INTERNAToNAL LAw 823-826 (1970).
50. 1880 IhNxAw PENAL CODE § 4.
HOLLINSHEADIssue
158 HASTINGS INT'L AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW Inaugural
which they commit abroad.51 Thus, these penal codes provide clear
guidance for the court in its determination whether a prosecution can
properly be based on conduct which took place beyond the borders
of the country in which it sits. Indeed, under facts quite similar to
Hollinshead, a Mexican national was convicted in Mexico for the theft'
of a truck in the United States.52 The court declared simply that a
crime committed by a Mexican national is punishable in Mexico.
Civil law countries, such as Mexico, generally make frequent use
of the nationality principle. Use of the nationality principle as a juris-
dictional base among common law countries, however, is clearly the
exception rather than the rule.5 s While the United States once ada-
mantly rejected the nationality principle, it is now growing toward
acceptance in certain areas. However, it is doubtful that the principle
is presently law in the United States. United States v. Bowman54 is
frequently cited as an announcement of the nationality principle as a
part of American jurisprudefhce. Yet, Bowman merely declares that
citizens of the United States while in a foreign country are subject
to the penal laws passed by the United States to protect itself and
its property. 55 Such language is a classic definition of the protective
principle of jurisdiction, irrespective of what label is attached.
In 1941 the Supreme Court of the United States declared in United
States v. Skiriotes:56
The United States is not debarred by any rule of international law
from governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas
or even in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or
nationals are not infringed. With respect to such an exercise of
authority there is no question of international law, but solely of
the purport of the municipal law which establishes the duty of the
citizen in relation to his own government."
The Skiriotes case, while seemingly an announcement of the nationality
principle, is peculiarly limited to its facts. Skiriotes was prosecuted
under a Florida statute for acts committed on the high seas. American
51. See DANISH CRIMINAL CODE art 7; TAE GEURL PAnre OF 1ni CRIMINAL CovE:
OF NORWAY arts. 318-321 (Ogle trans. 1965); JAPANESE PENAL CODE arts. 3, 4; FIUIcni
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE arts. 689, 695.
52. In re Guttierez, 24 Ir'rL L. REP. 265 (1961).
53. N. LEEcH, C. Ozivmi, J. SwEEN, TnE INTmmNATIONAL LEGAL SYsTEM 141
(1973).
54. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
55. Id. at 102, note 4.
56. Skiriotes v. State of Florida, 313 U.S. 70 (1941).
57. Id. at 73.
nationals as well as aliens have always been subject to the criminal
jurisdiction of the United States when aboard vessels under its flag on
the high seas.58 The court's statement that the United States is not
debarred by any rule of international law from governing the conduct
of its own citizens in foreign countries is an accurate statement of law.
Neither is Congress debarred under the United States Constitution
from making laws having explicit extraterritorial effect over United
States citizens when Congress thinks it appropriate. 59
It is clear that the nationality principle is an accepted principle
of international law, but it is far from clear that the Skiriotes court
was suggesting its blanket application as a jurisdictional base in the
United States. Indeed, the statement is qualified with the express limi-
tation that jurisdiction will not be exercised when the rights of other
nations or nationals have been infringed. It is difficult to imagine a
set of facts in which an American citizen commits acts abroad, con-
travening a United States penal statute, that do not infringe upofi the
rights of another nation or foreign national. The only factual situations
which would fit the court's jurisdictional base would be those acts
which are directed toward the United States itself, and which do not
affect, nor were intended to affect, the foreign nation or its nationals.
Treasonous. acts, counterfeiting securities, or income tax evasion for
example, would fit the jurisdictional limits of Skiriotes. Thus, in effect,
the nationality principle advanced in Skiriotes is so limited as only to
encompass acts for which the protective principle or the objective
territorial principle would provide jurisdiction.
In the recent case of United States v. Danizewski0 a United States
citizen upon returning to New York was convicted of distributing her-
oin in Thailand. The acts of-distribution took place completely outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The indictment was
found under the following language of 21 U.S.C. § 949(1): "It shall
be unlawful for any person to . . . distribute a controlled substance
... intending that such substance will be unlawfully imported into
the United States." The District Court concluded that the section was
intended to reach acts of distribution committed entirely outside the
territorial jurisdiction of -the United States. The court also stated
58. MooriE, supra, note 15 at 298.
59. Congress can make all laws "necessary and proper to execute the more specific
grants of power." U.S. CoNsT., art. I, § 8.
60. United States v. Danizewsi, 380 F.Supp. 113, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). This
case relies on 21 U.S.C. 174 whose language required a conspiracy to smuggle heroin
into the United States. 21 U.S.C. § 174 has been superseded by 21 U.S.C. § 959(l).
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that the United States may validly prescribe rules of law for citizens
whether the conduct occurs at home or abroad.0 1
The Daniszewski court based its sweeping statement on the 1970
Study Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code. The Code would con-
sider that there was a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction over an
offense where: "(d) the accused participates outside the United States
in a Federal offense committed in whole or in part within the United
States or the offense constitutes an attempt, solicitation or conspiracy
to commit a federal offense within the United States."02 The Code
itself merely codifies existing law and goes no further, declaring, "the
jurisdiction envisaged in Section 208(d) is styled 'objective' territorial
jurisdiction: it embraces conduct every element of which is performed
abroad but which significantly foreshadows the commission of an of-
fense of 21 U.S.C. § 952 - unlawful importation of a narcotic drug."O' '
Foreshadowing the commission of an offense is never defined, but
assumedly it means something just short of a conspiracy to commit
the offense. The objective territorial principle, as employed, is termed
a jurisdiction embracing acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended
to produce and producing detrimental effects within it.r4
The Daniszewski court again really does nothing more than apply
the protective principle, albeit labelled the objective territorial prin-
ciple. It could have held distribution of heroin with the intent that
the drug will be imported into the United States to be an act intended
to produce detrimental effects within the United States, and that the
trafficker knew his acts would result in harm in the United States or
that his acts were directed against the public safety or security of the
United States. The sweeping statement declaring the nationality prin-
ciple to be law in the United States goes well beyond the calling of
the facts in Daniszewski, and is really dictum.
In essence, the United States has not really adopted the nationality
principle and still stands strongly behind the territorial principle. The
courts have, on the other hand, greatly expanded the protective prin-
ciple of jurisdiction and the objective territorial principle. These greatly
expanded principles masquerade in many decisions as an adoption of
the nationality principle. The Supreme Court has in fact rejected the
nationality principle in one area where its acceptance is clearly needed.
In 1960, the Court denied the constitutional power of courts-martial
61. Id. at 115.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 114.
64. Id.
to try criminal acts committed abroad by dependents of United States
military personnel stationed overseas and by civilian employees in like
situations. 65
The protective principle and objective territorial principle, although
vague in their actual distinction and confused by the courts as labels,
are both very much present and being utilized in American criminal
cases. 6 It may be useful to examine the similarities in these jurisdic-
tional bases, rather than their evanescent dissimilarities.
The traditional definitions of the protective principle, as expressed
by the United States courts, describe a jurisdiction embracing conduct
that threatens a nation's security or governmental functions, 7 that
is directed against the territorial integrity or political independence
of a state,"8 or acts intending or producing effects within a nation's
boundaries.6 9 In first announcing the objective territorial principle70
in Strassheim v. Dailey,"' the United States Supreme Court, through
Mr. Justice Holmes, defined the jurisdiction as to include "[a]cts done
outside a jurisdiction but intended to produce and producing detri-
mental effects within it... '2 The two jurisdictional bases as defined
both require a certain degree of scienter. Acts must be directed against,
be an attack against, or be intended to produce detrimental effects.
The actor must expressly or impliedly have a requisite intent or knowl-
edge of a certain resulting harm to be subjected to United States
criminal jurisdiction under either principle.
The facts in United States v. Hollinshead do not lend themselves
to the protective principle nor to the objective territorial principle.
Underlying both these principles is the theory that th6 "detrimental
effects" constitute an element of the offense and since they occur with-
in the country, jurisdiction is properly invoked under the territorial
theory.73 The acts committed by Clive Hollinshead and Johnnie Fell
65. See McElroy v. United States ex reL Cuadliarco, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Griham
v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); Kinsella v. United States ex reL Singleton, 361 U.S.
234 (1960).
66. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2nd Cir. 1968) (protective princi-
ple); United States v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1974) (objective territorial
principle).
67. United States v. Pizzanisso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968).
68. United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F.Supp. 479 (1960).
69. Strassheim v. Dailey, 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
70. The label "objective territorial principle" was later attached to Justice Holmes'
words.
71. Strassheim v. Dailey, 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
72. Id. at 285.
73. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
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in Guatemala were obviously not directed against the United States
Government, nor were there actual harmful effects produced or in-
tended to be produced in the United States by their actions. Importa-
tion of art objects designated as stolen under Guatemalan law could
perhaps cause moral censure of the United States by the world com-
munity. But possible moral censure as a standard for the exercise of
criminal jurisdiction is hardly satisfactory. The artifacts themselves
produce no actual harmful effects in the United States. In contrast,
the heroin which was intended to be imported into the United States
in the Daniszewski case is quite clearly harmful to the health and
safety of the United States. The heroin itself produces harmful effects
and its importation or possession is a crime under the laws of the
United States. In the area of harmful drugs and narcotics, there exists
a legislatively-protected government interest.
.Hollinshead quite likely had no intention to violate United States
law. Indeed, he could only know his acts would result in a violation
of United States criminal law after the District Court made its after-
the-fact finding, there being no previously expressed legislatively-
protected interest in the area of plundered artifacts. 74
It is asserted by some scholars that under facts similar to Hollns-
head, jurisdiction may be sustained under a theory of theft as a con-
tinuing trespass. The concept of continuing trespass was a fiction which
enabled some courts to handle two-state cases without expanding rigid
notions of the territorial principle. This subterfuge devised to escape
the absolutism of the territorial theory was borrowed from the English
courts, which employed the continuous trespass theory to escape from
the rule that only the county in which the crime was committed could
convict an accused. This English rule, of course, had no international
aspects, and did not apply to cases in which goods were stolen in a
foreign country"i Many early American courts seized on the idea of
continuing trespass and held when goods were stolen in one American
state, and brought into another, there was a new "taking with felonious
74. The Regulation of Importation of Pre-Columbian Monumental or Architectural
Sculpture or Murals 19 U.S.C. § 2091 (1972), would now provide for seizure of such
artifacts unless accompanied by proper documentation declaring them to be legally
exported from the country of origin. The Act however does not provide for any criminal
sanctions against the importer who fails to produce such documentation. See also The
Treaty of Co-operation with the United States Providing for Recovery and Return of
Stolen Archeological, Historical, and Cultural Properties, July 17, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 494,
T.I.A.S. No. 7088, for a further example of United States responsibility and expression
of legislatively protected interest. The remedy provided by this treaty Is civil in nature,
judicial proceedings may be brought in a Federal District Court to recover the artifacts.
75. Rex v. Prowes, 1 Moody C.C. 349 (1832).
intent" in the latter state.76 Other early American courts rejected the
theory entirely, recognizing it to be merely a convenient fiction.7 The
courts which followed the theory usually limited it to goods stolen in
another American state.78 Occasional decisions extended the doctrine
to a theft in Canada.79 However, it is worth noting that the court in
Sta& v. Underwood,"0 in holding it was larceny in Maine to bring into
the State goods stolen in Canada, justified doing so chiefly on grounds
of social expediency; that Maine is a border state and the extradition
treaty with England did not cover larceny.
The theory of confinuing trespass is a vestige of the past when
courts felt bound by an absolutist interpretation of the territorial prin-
ciple. Indeed, some commentators have suggested the courts that did
apply the theory were actually using principles other than the terri-
torial principle, e.g., the protective principle, labelled as a continuing
trespass theory.81 Its present status in American jurisprudence is
historical rather than practical.
The acts committed by Hollinshead and Fell, without reference
to Guatemalan law, would even fail to give a United States court
jurisdiction under the greatly expanded jurisdiction of the Model Penal
Code.8 2 The Code goes well beyond common law tradition to permit
a state to invoke either the protected interest or the nationality prin-
ciple, by permitting exercise of jurisdiction if:
[T]he offense consists of the omission to perform a legal duty im-
posed by law of [the forum state] with respect to domicile, resi-
dence, or a relationship to a person, thing or transaction in the
State,... [or if] the offense is based on a statute of [the forum
state] which expressly prohibits conduct outside the state, when
the conduct bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of
this State and the actor knows or should know that his conduct is
likely to affect that interest.83
76. Commonwealth v. Holder, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) 7 (1857).
77. People v. Gardner, 2 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 477 (1807).
78. Strouther v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 789, 22 S.E. 852 (1895); Stanley v. State,
24 Oh. St. 166 (1873).
79. State v. Underwood, 49 Me. 181 (1858).
80. Id.
81. See George, Extraterritorial Application of Penal Laws 64 Mica. L. R11E. 609
at 610 (1966). Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Choice of Law in Criminal Casem, 24 Case
w. IsS. L. REv. 44 (1970).
82. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 (P.O.D. 1962).
83. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1) (e) - (f) (P.O.D. 1962).
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Municipal law, as implicitly recognized by the Code, establishes
the duties of the citizen in relation to his own government.84 Impliedly,
then, foreign law can establish no duty of an American citizen in
relation to the United States. The conduct in Hollinshead, without
reference to Guatemalan law, neither consisted of the omission to
perform a legal duty imposed by the United States, nor was the offense
based on a statute expressly prohibiting conduct outside the United
States which bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate United States
interest. Further, Hollinshead and Fell did not know nor should they
have known that their conduct was likely to affect that interest. It was
only after the District Court decision that the removal of art objects
from Guatemala was determined to be a legitimate United States
interest.
The language of the Model Penal Code raises a poignant criticism
of the Hollinshead conviction. It is highly questionable, as noted by
critics of the Code, whether one who acted outside the forum state
should be held criminally responsible because he or she "should have
known" that his or her conduct would affect an interest of the state
when the state would have to prove specific intent if the same act had
been done within its borders. 85 This approach permits a finding of
criminality on the basis of negligence.
Entertaining the fiction that Hollinshead and Fell were prosecuted
solely for their acts in the United States transporting the Machaquila
Stela 2 in interstate commerce one arrives at the second important
issue, choice of law. The general and almost universal rule is that the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly
by the law of the country where the act is done.80 The laws of each
state or country govern the nature of that offense. 87 As Secretary of
State John C. Calhoun stated in 1844: "Crimes, in a legal sense, are
local, and are so only because the acts constituting them are declared
to be so by the country where they are perpetrated." s8 No act com-
mitted in one country, however criminal according to its laws, is
84. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
85. George, supra, note 41 at 628.
86. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Slater v.
Mexican National R. Co., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
87. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
88. Mr. Calhoun, Secretary of State, to Mr. Everett, August 7, 1844, MS Inst,
Great Britain, SV 211.
criminal according to the laws of anothers 9 Choice of law simply does
not presently figure in United States criminal law.90
The notion that an. American court may not introduce the criminal
law of a foreign nation finds further support in the theory underlying
the very concepts of the protective and objective territorial principles
of jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court explained in Strass-
heim v. Dailey:91 "Acts done outside a jurisdiction but intended to pro-
duce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in
punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the
effect ... ."92 If indeed jurisdiction under the objective territorial prin-
ciple is measured "as if he had been present at the effect," how can
the criminality of such effect be measured by reference to the law of
another place? The contradiction involved by taking jurisdiction under
the protective or objective territorial principle, and then applying the
criminal law of the state wherein the act was committed (/ex loci) is
obvious.
Recently, some commentators have suggested that choice of law
should in fact figure in United States crimihal law. 3 The support of-
fered for this idea is somewhat circular. First, it is noted that territorial
principles and the idea of sovereignty as basic to choice of law found
early expression in criminal decisions, and it was from them that much
of later choice of law thinking, first in torts and then in other civil
areas, developed. Next, it is submitted that as a "new choice of law"
has emerged in civil actions, rejecting the Restatement (First) of
Conflict of Law and Professor Beale's strict notion of territoriality
as the basic test for choice of law, such should be the parallel de-
velopment in the criminal law. The analysis does recognize that choice
of law in criminal -cases, as well as in civil cases, would be limited by
constitutional due process of law.94
The criminal choice of law theory, principally espoused by Profes-
sor Leflar, while paralleling the development of "the new choice of
law" in civil actions, ignores the compelling differences in the character
of a civil action and a criminal action. These differences are clearly
acknowledged in the stringent safeguards guaranteed under the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution in all criminal
89. MooaE, supra, note 15.
90. H. Sm- am and D. VAos, TRANSNATONAL Pnonrzo s 774 (1968).
91. Strassheiin v. Dailey, 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
92. Id. at 285.
93. See principally Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Choice of Law in Criminal Casa 24
CAsE W. Ens. L. REv. 44 (1974).
94. Id. at 6.
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prosecutions.", The protection of the rights of accused persons in crim-
inal actions assured by constitutional due process clauses, simply can-
not be equated with the protection afforded parties in a civil action.
Further, even Leflar does not propose to apply the law of another
nation to a criminal prosecution in the United States. As pointed out
in the preface to his five "choice influencing" considerations in deciding
a question of criminal choice of law:"'
[T]he case will not be heard unless it is proposed to apply the
forum law to it. The question of jurisdiction and of choice of law
combine as one question - is the forum law applicable to the facts.
A preliminary part of the question is whether federal due process
requirements would be satisfied if forum law were applied."v
Leflar's criminal choice of law theory would then dictate against the
application of lex loci in a case similar to Hollinshead.
The stolen character of the stela was established under the law of
Guatemala. It cannot be doubted that the stolen character of the
-goods is an essential element of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. Solely
with reference to the laws of the United States, the acts committed
by Hollinshead and Fell within the territory of the United States were
not of an unlawful character. Transporting Mayan artifacts in interstate
commerce is not a crime in the United States. It is only through refer-
ence to Guatemalan criminal law that such an act can be characterized
as criminal.
American choice of law statutes already enacl:ed in the civil area
are on the whole somewhat vague and ambiguous, requiring consider-
able judicial interpretation." At the present time there exists no federal
choice of law statute applicable to criminal cases such as United States
v. Hollinshead. A few states"9 have enacted laws on criminal jurisdic-
tion, but most have not. Although it was not referred to in the Hollins-
95. U.S. CONST. amend. V guarantees indictment by a grand jury for all Infamous
and capital crimes, forbids double jeopardy and provides for an absolute right of the
accused against self-incrimination; U.S. CONST. amend. VI mandates a speedy and
public trial by an impartial jury in all criminal prosecutions, and guarantees the ac-
cused the right to confront any witnesses against him, the right to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor and the absolute right to have the assistance
of counsel for his defense.
96. These five choice-influencing considerations are the same group of considerations
Leflar has previously proposed be applied in civil actions. See Leflar, Choice-Influencing
Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1584 (1966).
97. Leflar, supra, note 85 at 19.
98. See Unger, Use and Abuse of Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 83 L.Q. Rv.
427 (1967); Danson, Territorially Limited Statutes and the Choice-of-Law Process, 1
HAIv.J.LEJs. 115 (1964).
99. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 27, 887 (West 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.03 (West
1973).
head decision, California is one of the few states which has enacted
fairly comprehensive laws on criminal jurisdiction:
The following persons are liable to punishment under the laws of
California: (1) Any persons who commit, in whole or in part, any
crime within this state .... lo
Whenever a-person, with intent to commit a crime, does any act'
within this state in execution or part execution of such intent, which
culminates in the commission of a crime, either within or without
this state, such person is punishable for such crime in this state in
the same manner as if the same had been committed entirely within
this state.' 0'
The statutes are of course not criminal choice of law statutes, but
rather a greatly expanded state criminal jurisdictional base. The im-
plication in the choice of law area lies in the last sentence of § 778(a):
"such person is punishable for such crime in the same manner as if
the same had been committed entirely within the state." The language
clearly intends that forum law will be applied to the extraterritorial
acts. Under the California penal statute, admission of foreign law or
lex loci is neither authorized nor even contemplated.
It is also interesting to note that the California Supreme Court,
despite the statutory language of Penal Code 27 and § 778(a) held in
People v. Buffum,102 that the crime of conspiracy cannot be committed
if the contemplated activity is to be completed outside the state. The-
Buffum decision exempted from the coverage of California criminal
law persons who transported pregnant women from their homes in
California to Mexico where abortions were performed. Thus even with
its expanded jurisdictional base, a California court might have come
to quite a different conclusion than the Federal District Court in United
States v. Hollinshead. The Court in Buffum apparently realized that
California penal Code § 27 and § 778(a), as literally read, overstepped
existing jurisdictional bases, and would raise due process questions.
The correct United States attitude in regard to criminal choice of
law is best reflected in the following language of the United States
Senate in its reservations as to understandings of the UNESCO Con-
vention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property:103
100. CAL. PENAL CODE § 27 (West 1970).
101, Id. § 778(a).
102. People v. Buffum, 40 Cal.2a 709, 256 P.2d 317 (1953).
103. UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 10
INTL LEGAL. MATMUALs 289 (1971).
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Presumably, the relevant law in the United States would recognize
the validity of foreign legislation declaring certain cultural property
within the jurisdiction of a foreign state to be inalienable. Illegal re-
moval of such property without consent of the owner should be
recognized as theft. This provision is not self-executing, however,
and in the absence of Federal legislation the decision would be
governed in each case by state law.10"
The attitude of the United States Government, as indicated by the
Senate, remains unchanged since Secretary of State John C. Calhoun's
statements in 1844.105 In the absence of specific Federal legislation (a
legislatively protected interest) the applicable law in any criminal
prosecution will be solely that of the forum.
If we now assume that Hollinshead and Fell were actually prose-
cuted solely for their acts in the United States, ignoring the District
Court's admission of Guatemalan criminal law, the decision could
nonetheless run afoul of constitutional due process. The Due Process
Clause precludes unrestricted application of spatially irrelevant law-by
a state court to a set of facts in civil actions. 10 6 This constitutional limi-
tation is supported by a long line of cases and has remained firm up
to the present time.10 7 The possible differences in elements constituting
the offense in a foreign nation also raise a plethora of possible due
process problems.'08 For example, what if intent is not a requisite
element in the crime of larceny in a piarticular state? The admission
of such nation's criminal law to establish the stolen character of prop-
erty in a prosecution under 28 U.S.C. § 2314 would be a clear denial
of due process.
The concept of criminal renvoi, wherein the prosecuting state refers
to the law of another state for the specific rule to be applied to par-
ticular facts, is not totally foreign to civilized nations. An example of
criminal law renvoi may be found in the Swiss Criminal Code, Article
104. Senate Bill to Implement UNESCO Convention, S. 2677, art. 13 (1973).
105. Supra, note 88.
106. Home Insurance v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
107. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 377
U.S. 179 (1964).
108. It is interesting to note here, that the law of Guatemala engrafts its national
control of antiquities into both its constitution and ts laws. A dichotomy between
private ownership within the country and national ownership of all property appears
as a dual system of ownership within the legislative scheme itself. According to Gua-
temalan law, regardless of an explicit recognition of private ownership, archeological
objects within the country are the property of the nation. One could commit larceny
by removing his own privately owned and lawfully possessed artifacts out of Cuatemala.
6(1).109 However, the use of criminal law renvoi in the United States
simply finds no support and is in direct contradiction to the weight of
authority.
The District Court and Court of Appeals opinions implicitly assume
that 18 U.S.C. § 2314 has an extraterritorial reach. Under certain cir-
cumstances a state may give an extraterritorial application to a penal
law with respect to conduct of its own citizens."10 There are a number
of laws in the United States which explicitly expand the locus to include
foreign countries. The Walsh Act of July 3, 1926 is a significant illus-
tration of such legislative design.II1 The Act provides for the penaliza-
tion under certain conditions of an American citizen residing abroad
who is needed as a witness in a criminal case, but fails to return to the
United States after being summoned. Indeed, the purpose of 21 U.S.C.
§ 959(1) under which United States v. Daniszewski'"2 arose, was ex-
plicitly to expand the locus of United States jurisdiction over illicit
drug traffic. However, all legislation is prima facie territorial.113 The
Supreme Court stated in United States v. Nord Deutcher Lloyd:11 4 "A
statute will as a general rule be construed as intended to be confined
in its operation and effect to the territorial limits within the jurisdiction
of the lawmaker, and the words and general scope will be construed
as meaning only those subject to that legislation."'1 5 Legislation by
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."8 The extension of
federal criminal jurisdiction will not be presumed, but must be clearly
expressed in the statute."-- If a state sees fit for reasons of public pol-
icy to prohibit the commission by its nationals of particular acts any-
where in the world, the scope of the prohibition should be definitely
expressed.1 8
There is little room in the territorial limitation on penal statutes,
109. See 1 M. BAssIouNI, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRauNxAL LAW 50, 51
(1973).
110. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
111. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1783, 1784.
112. United States v. Daniszewskd, 380 F.Supp. 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
113. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Sandberg v.
McDonald, 248 U.S. 185, 195 (1918).
114. United States v. Nord Deutscher Lloyd, 223 U.S. 512 (1912).
115. Id. at 516, 518.
116. Blacaner v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1931).
117. United States v. Sabbatino, 485 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. den., 415 U.S.
948 (1974).
118. Van Voorhis v. BrintnalL 86 N.Y. 18; Commonwealth v. LIme, 113 Mass. 458.
Issue HOLLINSHEAD
170 HASTINGS INT'L AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW Inaugural
as viewed by the United States, for judicial interpretation and con-
struction. In United States v. Bowman," 9 the Supreme Court did hold
that in certain situations criminal statutes were capable of extraterri-
torial reach over United States citizens, though there be no express
declaration to that effect. 120 However, this holding was limited to
criminal statutes dealing with acts that are directly injurious to the
Government. Thus, only statutes meeting the requirements of the pro-
tective principle will be given extraterritorial reach in the absence of
express legislative language. The acts committed by Hollinshead and
Fell, theft of artifacts in Guatemala, could not seriously be advanced
as directly injurious to independence, sovereignty, or property of the
United States.
International law aside, the actual intent of Congress in enacting
18 U.S.C. § 2314 is clear and has been frequently noted. The purpose
of former Section 415 of the title, now covered by § 2314, was to
penalize violators of state law who utilized the channels of foreign or
interstate commerce.12 1 Section 2314 itself was designed to implement
Federal-State cooperation in apprehending and punishing criminals. 12 2
The most recent pronouncement declared that in enacting this section
making it an offense to transport stolen goods, securities, monies, etc.,
in interstate commerce, Congress wanted to come to the aid of states.1 28
Nowhere in these statements on Congressional intent surrounding the
statute under which Hollinshead was prosecuted is there any sug-
gestion of extraterritorial operation. The states referred to are not other
nations. Congress was referring solely to the states comprising the
United States of America. Congress had no intention in enacting 18
U.S.C. § 2314 to come to the aid of foreign nations in punishing vi-
olators of their criminal laws. The use of the terminology "in foreign
commerce" must be read in the total context of the statute. It is used
to cover the subsequent transportation anywhere of goods "stolen" un-
der one of the state laws of the fifty states. Congress had no intent to
cover a subsequent transportation of goods originally "stolen" under
the criminal law of a foreign nation. Words having universal scope will
be taken as a matter of course to mean only everyone subject to such
legislation, not all that the legislation may subsequently catch.124 A
119. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
120. Id.
121. United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379 (1946).
122. Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F.Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
123. United States v. Patten, 345 F.Supp. 967 (D.C.P.R. 1972).
124. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
contrary reading would go beyond Congressional intent, invade the
sovereignty of other nations, and subject an actor to prosecution in two
different countries for the same act.
United States v. Hollinshead may perhaps be an ad hoc case, born
of diplomatic pressures levied by Guatemala and impending censure
by the world community. Nonetheless it raises many unanswered ques-
tions and throws light upon an unexamined abyss in American juris-
prudence, where international law, criminal law and conflict of law
converge. It is an area calling for careful analysis by legal scholars
and careful legislation by Congress. Ad hoc policy decisions by Ameri-
can courts, many of which make monumental leaps in legal logic and
development, only obscure the problem. Worse, they open the door
to political abuse by providing seeming support and authority for a
dangerous degree of judicial discretion in a wildly unsettled area.
United States v. Hollinshead leaves one with two disturbing questions
which await solution: May courts in the absence of legislatively defined
interests choose with unfettered discretion what "governmental inter-
ests" they wish to protect? Will the outcome of a prosecution of a
criminal accused based on extraterritorial acts continue to be left to
a process of result-selective subjectivity?
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